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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VESTED RIGHTS.-A trust to receive the rents and
profits of real property was established at a time when the only law subjecting trust funds to the claims of creditors was the Act of 1896, under which
only the surplus beyond the sum necessary for the support or education of
the beneficiary, was liable to be applied to the payment of his debts. Subsequently the legislature passed a statute subjecting ten per cent. of the income
of trust funds to the claims of creditors. The New York Court of Appeals,
by a vote of four to three, held that the statute was retroactive; and that
it does not violate the constitutional limitations as to the impairment of contracts and the interference with vested rights. Brearley School v. Ward, 94
N. E. Rep. IooI (N. Y. i911).
The majority opinion of the court takes the position that there was no
contract to which the trustee was a party, which could be impaired by the
retroactive enforcement of the statute. The dissenting judges held, on
the other hand, that the statute impairs the contract between the trustee, and
his cestui. But it is much to be doubted whether, in a strict sense, a contract
exists between the beneficiary and his trustee. True, a trustee is responsible
to his cestui as a fiduciary, and is liable if he has violated his trust. But
until the trust has been fully executed and the accounts settled up an action at
law will not lie against the trustee. Perry on Trusts, Sec. 843.
The question remains, whether the statute, operating retroactively, interferes with a vested right. A vested right has been defined as "an immediate
fixed right of present or future enjoyment." Fearne, Cont. Rem., I. And
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has decided that a vested right exists
"where a man has power to do certain actions, or to possess certain things,
according to the laws of the land." Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.)

330, 360 (1825).

Tested by these definitions, the exemption of all but the surplus of
trust funds under the New York statute of 1896 would seem to be a vested
right. But the authorities take a contrary view. It has been definitely
decided that the exemption privileges of a debtor are not vested rights. Leak
v. Gray, io7 N. C. 468; Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 233. A homestead exemption is not a vested right. .Mooney v. Moriarity, 36 Ill. App. 175; Noble v.
Hook, 24 Cal. 638. An exemption from taxation does not confer a vested
right, and may, therefore, be modified by the legislature. Shiner v. Jacobs,
62 Iowa 392; People v. Board of Assessors, 84 N. Y. 61o. And in Short's
Estate, 16 Pa. 63 (1851), it was held that an act subjecting property to a
collateral inheritence tax, although applicable by its terms to property of a
decedent who died before its passage, is not unconstitutional. The conclusion reached in Brearley School v. Ward, seems, therefore, to rest on a
basis of settled law.
COPYRIGHTS-MISTAKES

AS

PROOF

OF INFRINGEENT.-The

complainant

and the defendant were competitors in the business of publishing annotations,
or citations, of judicial decisions. The defendant was charged with misusing
the complainant's copyrighted compilations as the basis of their publications
and to prove such misuse the complainant showed that there existed in their
publications covering the decisions of the Courts of New York State some
one hundred and thirty-eight errors and inaccuracies and that the same
publications.
defendant's
in the
be the
found
were to of
mistakes
precise
errors
The Court
heldandthat
the existence
same
mistakes
in these
respective
compilations was proof positive of copying and since the defendant's books
were regularly published subsequently to those of the complainant, an inS ....
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junction was. issued to restrain the further publication and sale of the defendant's books. Frank Shepard Co. v. Zachary P. Taylor Publishing Co.,
185 Fed. 941 (911).
This case is interesting only as showing that a portion of the pirated matter, which the defendant company would most glady have refrained from
using, caused the discovery of their unfair methods. 'A the case of similar
books where a close resemblance is a necessary consequence of the use of the
same materials, the occurrence of the same errors affords one of the surest
tests of copying. List Publishing Co. v. Kellar, 3o Fed. 772. The copying
of the mistakes being proved, it is a fair presumption that the subsequent
compiler made use of more than the mistakes of his predecessor and unless
he is willing to prove just how much of the book is pirated an injunction
will lie to restrain the publication of the whole. West Publishing Co. v.
Lawyers' Co.-operative Publishing Co., 79 Fed. 756; Williams v. Smythe,
nIo Fed. 961.
EXTRADITION-INTERPRETATION

AND

ENFORCEMENT

OF

INTERNATIONAL

TREATY.-A United States citizen, accused of murder in Italy, fled to the

United States. His extradition was demanded by the Italian Government
under a treaty providing that "persons" accused of crime shall be delivered
up on demand. Italy, against the protest of the United States Government,
interprets the word "persons" to exclude Italian citizens. It was argued,
in habeas corpus proceedings, that the treaty was reciprocal; and that the
refusal of Italy to surrender her own citizens under the treaty had abrogated
it in so far as the surrender of American citizens by the United States is
concerned, even if the word "persons" includes United States' citizens. Held,
that the word "persons" includes citizens; and that it is not for the judiciary
to annul or modify treaties which still have the sanction of the other branches
of the government. Ex parte Charlton, 185 Fed. 88o (191I).
The court's interpretation of the word "persons" as used in the treaty
appears to be both reasonable and in accordance with the broad meaning
given the word in other connections. In Wing Wong v. United States, 16
up. Ct. 977, 163 U. S. 228 (1895), it was held that the word "persons" in the
fifth amendment of the Constitution is broad enough to include any and
every human being within the jurisdiction of the Republic. Hence an alienborn resident is entitled to the same protection under the laws, which a
citizen can demand. "Person" has also been held to include Indians, within
the Habeas Corpus Act, United States v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. 695 (z879),
even though Indians are not citizens under the Constitution. Elk v. Wilkins,
And in Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey
112 U. S. 94, 5 Sup. Ct. 41 (1884).
v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 475, 480, 483 (1879), it was held that
non-residents are "persons" within the meaning of a general law authorizing
a given number of persons to form a corporation to construct a railroad.
So also, private corporations have been held to be "persons" within the
fourteenth amendment. Home Ins. Co. v. State of New York, 134 U. S.
594 (1889). A county has been held a "person," in Lyman County v. State,
9 S. D. 413, 69 N. W. 6Oi (i8g6); and a foreign nation, in Republic of
Honduras v. Soto, xg N. E. 845, 112 N. Y. 310, 2 L. R. A. 642 (1889).
Having decided that the subject matter of the treaty includes citizens of
.the United States, the court merely applied a line of United States Supreme
Court decisions which held that it is not for the judiciary to decide whether
or not the treaty is still in force. In Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314
(1829), Chief Justice Marshall held that where treaties import contracts,
"when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial, department." And it was
decided, in Doe v. Broden, 57 U. S. 635, 656 (1853), that whether or not the
King of Spain had power, according to the Constitution of Spain, to annul
a certain land grant and cede it by treaty to the United States, was a
political, not a judicial, question. Still more pertinent to the question raised
in the recent case, is Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270 (19O1). In that case

RECENT CASES
it was held that the existerice of the treaty of June I6, 1852, between the
United States and Prussia, which had been repeatedly recognized by both
governments as still in force, notwithstanding the incorporation of Prussia
into the German Empire, could not be questioned by the judicial department
in proceedings for a habeas corpus to prevent the extradition of a fugitive
from Prussia. The question is political, and the courts must accept the
determination thereof by the political department of the. government.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-IRREGULAR CONTRACTS-EFFECT OF PART PERFoRBIANC.-A city, having power to grant an exclusive franchise for the

electric lighting of the city for a term of twenty years, undertook to grant
such a franchise by an ordinance which was void because the yeas and
nays of the city council were not entered upon the minutes as required
by law. The grantee company accepted the contract, built a plant, and
furnished light to the city and its inhabitants for a period of sixteen years.
The city itself then planned to erect a municipal lighting plant and the company sought an injunction to restrain the city from violating the franchise;
but the court held that the contract was void from the beginning and the fact
that it had been performed by the company for such a length of time with
the acquiescence of the city did not give the franchise any validity such
as would give the company the right to enforce it in equity for the remainder
of the term. Monett E. L. P. & I. Co. v. Incorporated City of Monett,
186 Fed. 360 (19x).
The reasoning of the court is in accordance with precedent. Whenever
the state legislature has made mandatory a certain course of procedure in
the passage of municipal ordinances, such course of procedure must be substantially complied with to give any validity to an ordinance or to a contract
made in compliance with it. City of Logansport v. Dykeman, et al., II6 Ind.
i5. A contract informally and irregularly made may be subsequently ratified;
but the act of ratification of an unauthorized contract must comply with
the provisions of the statute regulating the manner of entering into the
original contract. Borough of Milford v. Milford Water Co., 124 Pa. 6Io
(x(899).
No partial or complete performance of an unauthorized contract
will of itself serve to make it valid. McMannis v. Philadelphia, 210 Pa. 6r6
(I0o-).
A person dealing with a municipal corporation must see to it at his
peril that the law is complied with and the contract executed in a legal manner. McDonald v. Mayor,. &c., 68 N. Y. 23. But the person who has furnished money or property to a municipality in pursuance of an irregular
contract is not left absolutely without remedy. Under such circumstances the
municipality is subject to an implied obligation to return the money or
property in its possession and the law, independent of any statute, will compel
restitution or compensation. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Marsh v.
Fulton, io Wallace, 676.
When the municipality has performed its part of an irregular contract,
the other contracting party may not avoid liability by pleading that the contract was beyond the power of the municipality or executed in an irregular
manner. Some cases hold that he is estopped from so doing. Northhampton County's Appeal, 30 Pa. 305 (1858). Others hold, improperly it
seems, that the action of the city in attempting to enforce its claims under
the contract at law is a ratification of the contract. Amberson Ave. 179 Pa.
634 (x897) ; Sandy Lake Borough v. Gas. Co., I6 Super. Ct. 234 (go1).
By
this reasoning the courts refuse to allow legislation which is intended to
protect the citizens of municipalities from improper debts to be used as a
means of doing injustice to the municipality.
WILLs-CONTRAcTS

To MAKE LEGACIES-CONSIDERATIO.-In

Smith v.

Oliver, i9ix S. C. (Scotland) i03 (igio), the defendant's testatrix 'became interested in the erection of a church in the vicinity of her home. As the
neighborhood was a poor one, the plans were drawn for a building of an un-
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pretentious nature. The testatrix expressed her dissatisfaction with such a
scheme and, expressing a desire that the church should be much more elaborate, she indicated generally that she would meet whatever extra cost might
be involved. There was no evidence of a written obligation. The testatrix
was unable to make payment of any large sum during her lifetime, due to the
fact that her income was derived from trust funds, the capital of which
was not at her disposal while/she lived. During the completion of the
plans, the testatrix was consulted at various times and her wishes conformed
to. She assured the plaintiff that the necessary funds should be provided at
her death. By her instruction, a codicil to her will making the requisite
bequest was drawn but was never executed. It was held that it is perfectly
possible for one to bind himself in his lifetime to leave something in his will,
but that a mere promise cannot be turned into a contract by the promisee
simply averring that on the faith of the promise certain things were done by
him. As the transaction amounted to a gift, therefore, and there was no
evidence of it in writing, recovery was denied.
It is well established that a contract to leave something by will, if
founded upon valid consideration will be substantiated, Wright v. Tinsley,
30 Mo. 389 (i86o); Martin v. Wright, 13 Wend. 46o (1835); Updike v. Ten
Broeck, 32 N. J. L. 105 (x866); Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. i6i (872).
It it also well settled that a promisee cannot enforce a gratuitous promise
by merely showing that relying on the promise, he expended various sums
of money or incurred other detriment. This will not constitute a valid consideration. Osborn v. Governors of" Guy's Hospital, 2 Strange, 728 (1740);
McClure v. McClure, I Pa. 374 (1845).
Some of the cases have needlessly confused this question with the
Statute of Frauds. In Roehl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311 (1887), it was held
that under the seventeenth section, such an agreement must be in writing; but
the rule laid down in Wellington v. Apthorp, 145 Mass. 69, 1887, that such
cases do not fall within the operation of this section seems preferable. It
has been held that such contracts were within the provision of Sec. 4, cl. 5,
of 29 Car. II, in that they were not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. Vanduyne v. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. j42 (1858), but
this has not been followed, Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N. J. L. 105 (I866),
and under the principles generally adopted in the interpretation of this section, the former case is undoubtedly wrong. Fulton v. Emblers, 3 Burr
1278 (762); Blake v. Voigt, 134 N. Y. 69 (1892); Day v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.,
89 N. Y. 616 (1882).

Although, as the court recognizes, a particular hardship is done in this
case, the decision is sound and enunciates clearly the well-settled principles
of the law.

WILLS-PRSUIPTION

REGARDING WoRDs FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE.-

In Taylor's Estate, 230 Pa. 346 (i91), the question was presented, whether
testamentary dispositions appearing after the signature are presumed to have
been written before or after the execution of a will. The court held that in
the absence of proof the presumption is that they were written subsequent
to the signature; and if unattested and unsigned they are merely void, and
do not invalidate the will under a statute requiring that it be "signed at the
end thereof."
* To reach the presumption to which the court subscribes, requires, it is
submitted, the indulgence of two presumptions: (I) That words following
the signature are additions to the will, and were not a part of the original
draft thereof; (2) that all additions, alterations, etc., were made subsequent to the signature.
In definitely pronouncing the second presumption mentioned, the court
is simply settling the law of Pennsylvania in accord with the law of England and the great majority of Ameiican jurisdictions. See I Jarman on
Wills (910), I56, and cases cited; Page on Wills (i9oi), §432. There is.
therefore, nothing unusual or striking in connection with the rasing of this
presumption.
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But in presuming, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that words
following the signature are additions to, and not a part of, the will, the court
appears to be taking a more decided step. The presumption falls within that
category which is academically denominated, rebuttable presumptions of
law. These presumptions may be classified under three headings, namely,
those based on the probative force of the evidence, those which owe their
existence to some policy of the law, and those which have their origin in
procedural expediency.
A case in which the last-named type of presumption was raised was
Moore v. The Railroad, 173 Mass. 335 (i&9g). But obviously there is no
procedural convenience which could possibly dictate the presumption in the
case at bar. It must, therefore, belong to one of the two other classes
mentioned.
Rebuttable presumptions of law based on the probative force of the
evidence come into being where one fact follows another so often that it
may be regarded as the normal order of events. But it ij submitted that it
cannot be said with assurance that words following the signature of a will,
are so often written subsequent to the signature, that that may be regarded
as the normal order of events. For in one of the few cases which have
arisen in Pennsylvania, it was definitely shown that the testator had written
the words before signing. Wineland's Appeal, 1i8 Pa. 37 (887).
The presumption seems, therefore, to be of the third order and to be
supported by some policy of the law. If this be so, the particular policy of
the law must be one favoring testacy as opposed to intestacy. Needless to
say, this has not always been the policy of the law when dealing with alleged
testamentary documents in courts of probate, as contrasted with courts of
construction.
Whatever its basis and whatever its effect, the decision in Taylor's Estate,
establishes a rule of presumption contrary to that which was, prior to the
decision of Teed's Estate, 225 Pa. 633 (igO), regarded as the rule in Pennsylvania; pronounced in Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409 (1847). That decision
had been generally regarded as setting up the presumption that words following the signature were written prior thereto. That rule was repudiated in
Teed's Estate, supra, by way of dictum, and Taylor's Estate crystallizes the
dictum in Teed's Estate into established law.

